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SUPPLEMENT

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SUBJECT

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Hala's Speech to Executive Committee of regraded to Paopla's Party This document is necesstance with the NFIDER TAL in accordance with the siter of 18 C taber 1978 from the director of the later pence to the se . i his t. a.es. rchiv

The following translation is of a speech, classified confidential by the Party, which was delivered by Minister Hala, Vice-Chairman of the Peoples Party, to a closed meeting of the Executive Committee of the Peoples Party on 21 June, 1947.

3. The public communique issued the following day deleted the more critical parts of the speech. The principal weight of the Executive Committee meeting was placed on foreign affairs and Father Hala's speech put forth the general line the party is to follow in foreign policy.

Executive Counittee - 21 June 1947

Since the last meeting of the Executive Committee we have been witnesses of an entire succession of events which, by their rapid occurrence, by their revolutionary tendencies or importance, changed and are changing the political atmosphere of the world. After the Moscow conference of the Four Great Powers, where no agreement was reached and where different points of view on the question of Germany and her future were merely made more certain, a period began in international policy which is marked by preparations (that is, especially ascertaining certain positions and points of view) before the November London Conference, where decisions shall be made not only on Germany but also on whether the world will cooperate or whether it will be divided.

Of course I shall not mention in detail about those changes and revolutions which characterized the political life of Central and Eastern Europe in the last two months. These events have been made sufficiently clear in the press. I shall attempt rather to classify all events into a frame of a world evolution, as, in the end, these events can be properly evaluated and understood only from the point of view of Great Power politics.

About three months ago America announced her definite interest in Europe, and, in addition the speech of President Truman, indicated in what direction American policy is intending to develop concerning Europe. This policy is better known as the Truman Doctrine. What does it mean for all practical purposes? It is the belief that disagreement between the Soviet Union and America is one which cannot be overcome. So that this disagreement might not lead to war, and so that conflict would not arise out of it, the Truman Doctrimo sees only one road: to obtain such superiority of strangth that the peaceful policy of America cannot be disturbed by anything or by anyone. Obviously then the Truman Doctrine comes out with these conditions:

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1. Russia is frightfully weakened economically by the war.

2. Russia cannot wage a war aggressively.

3. Russia does not have the atomic bomb.

Against this:

1. America is not weakened by the war.

2. She has the atomic bomb as well as other terrible weapons.

3. America can with her help strengthen other countries which do not want war or an expansion of Soviet influence.

Even if these conditions are true to a certain extent, the conslusions which we draw from them are already very debatable. As is known, one of the results, for instance, of these conditions was American help to Turkey and Greece. A further result could be further help to all anti-Soviet regimes, which as a consequence could in the end lead to the support of fascist, undemocratic regimes only for the reason that they are anti-Soviet.

For that reason, America herself, it seems, submitted the original Truman Doctrine, which from a diplomatic point of view was not sufficiently subtle, to a revision. Many American democrats were naturally opposed to assistance to furkey, as it democracy was doubted. And a still stronger argument against the integral application of the Truman policy was, naturally, that open assistance against Soviet intentions on countries in Europe would cost the American taxpayer very high taxes, in addition to which the results for democracy and for the welfare of the American citizen appeared to be more than doubtful. Finally, according to the opinion of many, competition in gaining strength would lead to open conflict rather than to its suppression.

If the Truman Doctrine practically meant an economic and diplometic offensive against Russia in order that American strongth and its positions would become inviolable, then Russia certainly would consider it appropriate to show that against such an offensive it is not so weak as American policy presumes, making the Soviet weakness the central starting point of her deliberations. To the series of Soviet counter-measures we must add all that happened with respect to Communist Parties in Bulgaria, Hungary, and to some extent in Austria. Cortainly the USSR showed that if the dollars and economic help of America are a strong weapon, the discipline of the masses united in the Communist parties can equally represent a very disquieting and strong argument.

As to the rest, even western Europe wasn't entirely spared from this Soviet-American clash which demonstrated itself unsuccessfully after the Coscow conference. Very serious strikes in France crippled to a great extent the economic life of France for some time, because gradually all industrial branches were affected, as well as public services (railroads, transportation in general, electric works, telephones, etc.) and these strikes arose spontaneously because of the despairing economic situation. One not entirely deprived of political significance. I believe that the Communists who left the French government showed that their strength continues to be a serious factor, and that a coalition government without their participation could be deprived of the cooperation of the working masses, and thus seriously handicapped. The French strikes were in this way instructive even for our conditions.

As a result of this situation, the Truman Doctrine came to an important revision. On the 5th of June, Secretary of State Vershall's speech said that American assistance is promised to all European countries without discrimination so long as these European countries thenselves agree in what manner and to what degree American help for European organizations should be furnished. Americans desire to help for various reasons. They need an outlet for export for their own industry. If they do not enable Europe to but, in the end they will have to pay burdersome millions for their own unemployment. Further in the raising of the European standard of living America sees the best protection against the expansion of Communism, which naturally is most prevalent in the midst of poverty and

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hunger, when any kind of remedy can appear better than the existing misery. Finally, even a third reason is apparent: reasonable Americans see more and more that not only the world and mankind but also welfare and peace are indivisable. So long as war permanently threatens peace in one part of the world, the other half is threatened as well; likewise, hunger existing in one half of the world means that the welfare of the other half is threatened. Now the concern is that Marshall's offer will be accepted. Before all else it is well to realize the European idea with regard to the matter. We well know that Europe without Russia and England is simply Europe with German superiority. It is for that reason that Marshall's offer had to be addressed to all of us, including Russia. We Czechs sense this need of Russian participation especially. We know what happened when Russia in 1938 was pushed out of Europe. Munich did not mean only the lopping off of Czechoslovakia. In international politics Munich meant knocking Russia out of European politics. You know what the results were. Russia came back along side Germany — and a second World War resulted.

It is clear to me that Marshall's offer embarrassed factions in Eastern Europe. The non-acceptance of it could mean for the world public unwillingness to help with the economic restoration of Europe. The acceptance of it means the beginning of concrete cooperation with the West. There are, of course, even in the West, foolish people who conceal in their heart the hope that Moscow will refuse the offer, which will give them then the full right to organize a Western Europe in their own way, without Russia, but with the industrial half of Germany.

We must not let it escape us that we as Czechoslovakia and as a party, which in its own internal political concept worked always toward creative cooperation between the East and Test, are getting into a troublesome situation, particularly if a negative decision were to be made, and a definite division of the world into a Western and Eastern half should result. If Tarshall's new formula of American policy and Marshall's challenge to unite Europe or some countries of Europe means essentially an appeal for o only laying the cerds on the table, we cannot today exclude the possibility that a risunderstanding between Testern and Eastern Europe in these questions could lead to an actual division of the world.

Even if perhaps circumstances in Hungary or elsewhere may have more influence on the public in imagining its own dramatic and adventurous downfall, you may believe that on the problems connected with Pershall's revision of the original brutal Truman Doctrine and the Soviet reaction to it, there rests the principal question of today's international policy.

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